Introduction
Hugo de Groot (Grotius) (1583-1645), internationally known as the father of international law, is also celebrated for his seminal works on the law of nature and for his exposition of seventeenth century Dutch civil law in his Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid, first published in 1631. Johannes Voet's principal work is his comprehensive Commentarius ad Pandectas, published in two volumes in 1698 and 1704. In the commentary, his explanations of Roman law are followed by that of modern law (the jus hodiernum). The latter are to a large extent based on his lectures, and among the sources quoted, De Groot's Inleidinge "occupies pride of place".
Voet does not enjoy the international acclaim accorded to De Groot, and his general views on the nature of law and the law of nature, as expounded in the first part of the first title of his Commentary, has not received much attention in scholarly discourse.
2 Yet he remains a foremost representative of Dutch legal scholarship of the seventeenth century.
In his exposition of the law of nature, Voet expresses criticism of De Groot's views as to the basis (foundation) of the law of nature. The criticism provides fascinating insight into the exposure of De Groot and Voet to the subtleties of the esoteric theological debates in Reformed (Calvinist) circles of seventeenth-century Holland. The purpose of this note is to highlight the theological background to the difference of opinion between two prominent seventeenth-century Dutch lawyers as to the foundations of natural law.
Religious debates
As the seventeenth century commenced the Netherlands faced a number of problems.
3
Foremost in the early years was the debate between the Leiden professors Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609) and Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641) about the freedom of will, predestination and determinism. 4 The Reformed (Calvinist) orthodoxy of the early seventeenth century resolved the problem of reconciling God's omnipotence and omniscience with human free will by the adoption of a doctrine of rigid and absolute predestination as an eternal decree of God.
Arminius leant towards the Pelagian emphasis on the free will of man. He contended that God elected on the basis of his foreknowledge of the individual's decision whether or not to accept God's offer of salvation; that is, he advocated a conditional predestination in contrast to the absolute (and double) predestination of John Calvin (1509 Calvin ( -1567 and Theodore Beza (1519 Beza ( -1605 . Arminius was vehemently opposed by Gomarus who firmly supported the orthodox Calvinist view on predestination.
The debate created deep divisions in Dutch society. De Groot was a firm supporter of Arminius, as were other prominent personalities such as Oldenbarneveldt, Episcopius and Uytenbogaert. When Arminius died in 1609, De Groot helped his successor, Simon Episcopius, in drawing up the famous Remonstrantie, a document in which five points of divergence from orthodox Calvinism are set out. The principal divergence that needs to be highlighted within the present context is the advocating of the conditional predestination of Arminius rather than the absolute (and double)
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The only comprehensive evaluation of Voet's views of which I am aware is Domanski 2013: 251-265. 3 For a brief but full account, see Price 1994: 109-205. 4 See Gottshchalk-Stuckrath 2010: 104-121. predestination of Calvin and Beza. The supporters of Gomarus countered with a "counter-Remonstrant" in which orthodox Calvinism was affirmed. The Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde Kerk, previous Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk) as established state church since 1579, had embraced particularly the Calvinist creed and it was inevitable that any attack upon its doctrine and authority would carry political overtones. The religious controversy aggravated the dispute between the province of Holland and the orthodox Calvinist majority of the States General under the leadership of Prince Maurits. The tolerant attitude of the Arminians elicited accusations of treason -Uytenbogaert was accused of having become a papist and that he and Arminius were pensioners of Catholic Spain. De Groot was looked upon as a crypto-catholic, and his plea for moderation in his Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae ac West-Frisiae Vindicata (1613) 5 had little impact. Prince Maurits, with the support of the Counter-Remonstrants, resolved the issues by convening the Synod of Dordt in 1618. The Synod has, perhaps somewhat cynically, been described as an ecclesiastical smokescreen for the resolution of a political power struggle ("een kerkelijk rookgordijn waarachter een politieke machtstrijd werd beslecht").
6
At the Synod, the Counter-Remonstrants outnumbered the Remonstrants. Arminianism was rejected and Gomarus (who by then was professor in Groningen) vindicated. In addition, the orthodox view of predestination was confirmed. Remonstrant church services were banned and Remonstrant preachers (including Episcopius) were deposed. In the political outflow, Oldenbarneveldt was condemned to death and executed; Uytenbogaert was forced into exile; and De Groot was sentenced to life imprisonment and incarcerated in Loevenstein castle from where he made his famous escape after two years.
It was during this period that the esoteric supra-infralapsarian debate became part of the theological discourse in orthodox Calvinism.
7 In Calvinist theology, lapsarianism concerns the logical order of God's eternal decrees of salvation: Did God's decree to save certain people come before (supra, ante) or after (infra, post or sub) the decree to permit the fall (lapsus) of mankind into sin? According to supralapsarians, the double predestination of election and reprobation occurred prior to God's decree that encapsulates mankind's fall (lapsus) into sin. Infralapsarians insisted that the decree of predestination follows on the decree of creation and the fall into sin. The Canons of Dordt softened the doctrine of predestination in the direction of infralapsarianism though supralapsarianism was not explicitly rejected. Gomarus continued to hold strong supralapsarian views. 10 At the time of his death, Voetius was involved in a controversy with one Cephas Pistophilus. This was the pseudonymn of Petrus Allinga who was born in Enkhuizen, studied in Utrecht, and thereafter became preacher in Wijderen in Noord-Holland. He has been described as "a strong supporter of Cartesian Coccejanism" ("een hevig voorstander van het Cartesiaansche Coccejanisme"). 12 Voetius dedicated the second part of his Politica Ecclesiastica (1669) to his grandson.
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Hugo de Groot (1583-1645)
Like Johannes Voet, De Groot was a deeply religious man and a devout Christian. 13 He had a large body of theological works to his name which were collected and published after his death.
14 De Groot's spiritual and intellectual roots are in the Renaissance and Christian Humanism of More, Colet, Desiderius Erasmus, Arminius and the Spanish scholastics.
15 GHM Posthumus Meyjes 16 says that De Groot was "primarily a Christian Humanist scholar whose desire was to uphold and continue the religious programme as interpreted in the 16 th century by Erasmus and others, in defiance of the bitter reality of a Christian world split and hardened by confessional differences".
De Groot rejected as unreasonable and illogical the determinism of orthodox Calvinism and defended the doctrine and ideal of freedom of the will.
17 AH Haentjens says that "[d]e erkenning van de wilsvryheid was voor hem een onontbeerlijk en zeer belangrijk onderdeel van die waarheid van den Christelijken godsdienst".
18 The doctrine of the freedom of will finds powerful expression in De Groot's theological works such as his De Veritate Religionis Christianae.
19
De Groot's understanding of natural law must be seen against this background. It has been said that his understanding of natural law cannot be divorced from his theology, and that we cannot understand his ideas on natural law without recognising their theological nature.
20
De Groot's natural law doctrine makes a first brief appearance in the second chapter of his De Jure Praedae, written in 1604, but published only in 1868.
21 It is thereafter set out in detail in the Prolegomena and first and second Books of his De 12 See De Wet 1948: 51; Duker 1897 -1915 states that "(e)en lichtpunt was werderom in Voetius' familie de zeldzaam-gunstige aanleg en ontwikkeling van Johannes, oudste zoon van Paul uit diens eersten echt". 13 Pont 1945: 190 This maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly sketched, and which is constant with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called.
24
In a later paragraph 25 of the Prolegomena De Groot says that there is also another source of law besides the source in nature:
Another source of law besides the source in nature, is the free will of God to which beyond all cavil our reason tells us that we must render obedience.
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These two passages encapsulate in summary form the essence of De Groot's thinking on the source and nature of law. Human reason is for him the basis of the laws and institutions of society. But law also has a divine base, the free will of God, which it is for man to discover and apply. Reason is accordingly the means by which man gains knowledge of law in nature and of the will of God.
Building on this foundation, De Groot defines natural law as follows:
The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.
28
The idea that the source of natural law is to be found in the rational and social nature of man is re-stated in the passage singled out by Voet in his criticism of De Groot:
29
(1) In two ways men are wont to prove that something is according to the law of nature, from that which is antecedent and from that which is consequent. Of the two lines of proof the former is more subtle, the latter more familiar. Proof a priore consists in demonstrating the necessary agreement or disagreement of anything with a rational and social nature; proof a posteriori, in concluding, if not with absolute assurance, at least with every probability, that that is according to the law of nature which is believed to be such among all nations, or among all those that are more advanced in civilization. For an effect that is universal demands a universal cause; and the cause of such an opinion can hardly be anything else than the feeling which is called the common sense of mankind. 
33
It is to be expected that the idea that first principles of natural law have their origin in the social consciousness and the dictates of reason of man would be anathema to orthodox Calvinism with its firm belief in divine determinism and predestination.
Johannes Voet (1647-1713)
Johannes Voet was appointed as Professor Ordinarius Pandectarum at Utrecht in 1673 where his grandfather had been Professor of Theology since 1634. After the death of his grandfather, he accepted an invitation to Leiden where he remained till his death on 9 September 1713. His personal life was that of a devout Christian: he served as a member of the church council of the Reformed Church in Utrecht.
In his professional life he remained in essence a lawyer whose main achievement was the exposition of the current Dutch civil law in the light of the Pandects of Roman law. His Christian convictions, however, come to the fore in his discussion of the fundamental principles of law and justice, of equity and justice and of natural It was inevitable that these differences would be reflected in their concept of the fundamental principles of law and justice, and of natural law. What is more, in their discourse the supra-infralapsarian discourse raises its head in a subtle way.
Voet has a fair amount of criticism about the matter: It will be convenient, at the outset, to have regard in some detail to his opening statement in the first title of the first book of the Gane (1955 Gane ( -1959 .
Whenever our fancy leads us to scan with close attention the origins, the growth as well and the prolonged continuation of right up to the present day of mankind, we shall find that at no time and in no place has it found itself without law of right and honour. This was not so even in those quarters or ages in which savage mortals knew nothing whatever of the way of a life with culture, but in which herbs and acorns were their food, the forests their homes, and their woodland beds spread by their hill-wives.
It is quite true that the use of untainted reason, precise in everything and unacquainted with deceit, perished along with the original uprightness of morals owing to the fall of our firstformed parents (per lapsum protoplastarum).
Yet strength of mind and sense of virtue were not so utterly extinguished in mankind that no few sparks remained of the principles of justice and honour, like rubble from some fine mansion or planks taken from a wrecked ship. Thus certain rules of justice and equity remained divinely engraved on men's hearts and inborn, dictating to each one what was lawful or unlawful, what things to do and what to avoid. These rules no man, if he debates it with himself and reflects privately upon them in quietness of mind, eradicate without an inward conflict. Not only does Holy Writ invoke them, but even the best and most learned of heathen recognize them …
39
The use by Voet of the term per lapsum protoplastarum is revealing: lapsus is the term used in theological discourse in Latin to denote the Fall of Man as described in Genesis, the first Book of the Christian Bible.
40 Protoplastus (derived from the Greek πρωτοπλαστός) is used to denote the first formed man, Adam, and in the plural, the first of mankind.
41 What Voet is in essence saying is that the principles of law were in existence before the fall of mankind into sin, that after the fall there remained ingrained into the hearts of men some remnants (scintillae) of the knowledge of right and wrong, but that these were ascertainable not by man's own efforts, but in Holy Scripture (sacrae literae) and in the teachings of the best and most learned men. Latham (ed) 1965 : sv "proto -protoplastus". The forms "protoplaustus", "protoplasta" and "protoplausta" also occur. The term is used by the early Christian (patristic) writer Tertullianus in his De Exortatione Castitatis 2 fin and Adversus Judaeos 13.
Underlying Voet's concept of law and of the basis of natural law is the supralapsarian thinking of orthodox Calvinism. In Commentarius 1 1 14 he states:
It is enough to say that God, the creator of nature, is also the founder of natural law …
42
In Commentarius 1 1 15 he adds that natural law is more ancient than any human society; and hence society, being later than that law, cannot be conceived as the foundation of that law, which is prior in time.
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This is the background of Voet's criticism of De Groot as enunciated in Commentarius 1 1 15. He asks the question as to the primum principium (first principle) of natural law, and observes that there are many diverse answers to the old question of the highest good (summum bonum). He proceeds as follows:
As to what is the groundwork of this natural law, what is the foundation and first principle from which it can be proved a priori (as they say)
44 and as it were drawn out of the holy shrine of justice itself, and what is the province of natural law, there has been no fewer disagreements on those points than in the many discordant opinions which divided philosophers of old on the question of the highest good (summum bonum).
Some thought it right to place the foundation in a concordance or discordance with natural and social reason before it had been sullied by the fall of man (Grotius De Jure Belli ac Pacis 1 1 12). But what, pray, is that but to beg the question? The very question is whether this thing or that is in concordance with uncorrupted nature or right reason; and it follows that the answer must be derived from some other foundation. Others seek the main principle of all natural law in the social character of man (Pufendorf De Jure Naturae et Gentium, in the preface). 45 But not rightly, in my opinion; for natural law embraces in its scope not only duties to other men living in the same society, but also towards God and towards one's own self, even when sundered from all relation to human society.
46
Voet states his final conclusion as follows (Commentarius 1 1 15):
This being so, nothing strikes one more clearly on deep examination of the whole matter than that the source and wellhead of the whole of natural law, from which every principle of 47 brought to being man himself and all things else for his benefit. Man seeing this with right reason and own judgment, and acknowledging the high benevolence, wisdom and power of the Creator, cannot but be conscious and convinced of the very close obligation arising from the very blessing of his creation.
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In the ultimate result, the difference between De Groot and Voet is to be found in the way in which they conceive the role of mankind's freedom of will. For De Groot, the law of nature finds its foundation and substance in the dictates of right reason, and right reason is firmly within the sphere of mankind's freedom of will. Voet finds the origin of the law of nature in an eternal decree of God, and mankind's role is confined to acknowledgment of the wisdom and power of God, and consciousness of the obligation arising from this blessing of God's creation. 49 
Conclusion
Voet' criticism of De Groot's concept of the first principles underlying the law of nature has left little or no traces in subsequent debates or learned discourse among the writers on the Roman-Dutch law. Both Van der Keessel and Van der Linden in their respective commentaries on De Groot's Inleidinge followed De Groot's views without making any reference to Voet. By the time Voet penned his criticism of De Groot, the vehemence which had characterised the theological debate in the early part of the seventeenth century had abated. Moreover, the lawyers were not interested in this kind of debate, and the 
